Knobs & Handles — Google Ads Historical Audit
Long-term research document tracking the full history of knobs & handles in Google Ads from launch (2020) through the present. Covers campaign structure, conversion tracking issues, the item ID change, and why performance never recovered after the initial period.
Related: audit/2026-02-11/knobs-and-handles-analysis.md covers the Dec 2025–Feb 2026 period in detail, including product economics and order behaviour analysis.
Total Investment
Across all dedicated knob/handle campaigns (2021–2025): £10,650 spent, 21,701 clicks, 1,386 attributed conversions, £58,613 attributed revenue, 5.50x ROAS. The headline ROAS is misleading — it’s inflated by PMax attribution artefacts in mid-2023 and late 2025. Stripping those out, real performance was closer to 2–3x blended, with one genuinely strong quarter (Q3 2022).
Campaign Timeline
| ID | Campaign | Type | Period | Spend | Clicks | Conv | Revenue | ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | AP | Shopping | Catch All | Shopping | Jan–Jun 2020 | Mixed with all products | — | — | — | — |
| 30 | AP | Standard | Trial | Knobs And Handles | Shopping | Nov 2021–Jan 2022 | £1,122 | 1,270 | 32 | £1,238 | 1.10x |
| 33 | AP | Knobs & Handles | Performance Max Trial | PMax | Jan–Apr 2022 | £1,149 | 1,876 | 41 | £1,957 | 1.70x |
| 47 | AP | Performance Max | Knobs & Handles | NEW ID’S | PMax | Jul 2022–Feb 2023 | £903 | 1,452 | 58 | £5,089 | 5.64x |
| 49 | AP | Performance Max | All Knobs and Handles | PMax | Jul 2022–Aug 2023 | £4,913 | 7,315 | 1,173 | £43,208 | 8.80x* |
| 74 | Knobs Only Shopping (SC) | Shopping | Oct 2025 | £104 | 85 | 2 | £61 | 0.58x |
| 75 | PMax: Knobs Only Shopping (SC) | PMax | Oct–Dec 2025 | £2,461 | 9,703 | 80 | £7,060 | 2.87x** |
* Campaign 49 ROAS massively inflated by Jun–Jul 2023 PMax attribution artefacts (see Phase 8). ** Campaign 75 Nov–Dec 2025 data includes 2,300+ page view conversions and 2.1M impressions from PMax Display/YouTube.
Phase-by-Phase Narrative
Phase 1: Pre-History (Jan–Jun 2020)
Knob products ran inside the general “AP | Shopping | Catch All” campaign (ID 11) alongside all other products. No product-level data survives from this period — Google’s API doesn’t retain product-level Shopping data from 2020. Campaign 11 shows £2,373 total spend at 3.32x ROAS across all products, but we can’t isolate knob performance.
Some product-level data does exist from Q2 2020 in google_ads_product_raw_daily for Shopify product IDs that appear to be hairpin leg products, not knobs. The knob product Shopify IDs (5150347xxxxxx series) don’t appear until Q4 2021 in the product data.
Key gap: We cannot confirm the “knobs launched well in 2020” narrative from the data. That claim relies on memory or agency reports.
Phase 2: The Gap (Jul 2020 – Oct 2021)
No Shopping campaigns running for ~16 months. Campaign 11 stopped in June 2020. Campaign 29 (the replacement general Shopping) started September 2021 but knobs weren’t in a dedicated campaign until November 2021.
This gap was likely caused by stock-outs. The consequence was severe: Google Shopping builds product-level quality scores over time (click history, conversion rates, relevance signals). A 16-month absence meant starting from zero when the products returned.
Phase 3: Dedicated Shopping Trial (Nov 2021 – Jan 2022)
Campaign 30: “AP | Standard | Trial | Knobs And Handles”
| Month | Impressions | Clicks | Spend | Conv | Revenue | ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 2021 | 185,051 | 998 | £866 | 27 | £1,088 | 1.26x |
| Dec 2021 | 28,109 | 155 | £152 | 1 | £34 | 0.23x |
| Jan 2022 | 19,395 | 117 | £104 | 4 | £116 | 1.11x |
November looked promising (1.26x ROAS, 27 conversions), but December collapsed to 0.23x. January limped along before the campaign was replaced by PMax.
The drop from November to December is notable: impressions fell 85%, suggesting the agency pulled budget after poor December performance. But this is also Black Friday → post-Christmas seasonality — November always outperforms December in home goods.
All conversions were “Transactions (The Hairpin Leg Co.)” — real purchases. No page views or add-to-carts polluting the data.
Phase 4: PMax Trial (Jan – Apr 2022)
Campaign 33: “AP | Knobs & Handles | Performance Max Trial”
| Month | Impressions | Clicks | Spend | Conv | Revenue | ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2022 | 55,184 | 416 | £222 | 4 | £199 | 0.90x |
| Feb 2022 | 90,143 | 584 | £367 | 14 | £601 | 1.64x |
| Mar 2022 | 71,184 | 477 | £294 | 13 | £373 | 1.27x |
| Apr 2022 | 57,950 | 399 | £266 | 9 | £783 | 2.94x |
A slow improvement trend. PMax started poorly (0.90x) but reached 2.94x by April as the algorithm learned. Campaign 30 (Standard Shopping) overlapped in January, then was paused.
Again, all conversions were “Transactions” — real purchases. PMax was learning, but £1,149 total spend over 4 months is modest; the algorithm never had enough conversion volume to optimise effectively.
Phase 5: The ID Change Gap (May – Jul 2022)
May–June 2022: No dedicated knob campaigns running. The agency (Add People) was preparing the item ID change.
July 2022: Two new PMax campaigns launched simultaneously:
- Campaign 47: “NEW ID’S” — same products with
(new)appended to every offer_id (e.g.,shopify_gb_5150347165830_34746935017606(new)) - Campaign 49: “All Knobs and Handles” — contained the original knob IDs plus new handle products (Knurl Pull Handle, Spiral Pull Handle, and later Bar Trim Pull Handle)
The (new) suffix was literally appended to Shopify’s auto-generated shopify_gb_PRODUCT_VARIANT format IDs. The underlying products were identical — same Shopify product ID, same variant ID, just with (new) tacked on.
Phase 6: The Good Period (Aug – Nov 2022)
The only period where knobs performed genuinely well post-relaunch. Weekly data tells the story:
| Week Starting | C47 Clicks | C47 ROAS | C49 Clicks | C49 ROAS | Combined ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 15 | 42 | 10.72x | 92 | 6.11x | 7.41x |
| Aug 22 | 57 | 9.82x | 97 | 20.49x | 17.10x |
| Aug 29 | 42 | 17.38x | 95 | 4.80x | 8.63x |
| Sep 12 | 50 | 17.85x | 103 | 9.59x | 12.39x |
| Sep 19 | 54 | 21.69x | 73 | 3.17x | 9.39x |
| Oct 10 | 82 | 8.87x | 78 | 8.25x | 8.53x |
| Oct 24 | 85 | 3.74x | 101 | 6.61x | 5.24x |
| Nov 7 | 63 | 8.52x | 183 | 8.93x | 8.84x |
| Nov 14 | 57 | 8.56x | 189 | 4.93x | 5.57x |
Multiple weeks above 8x ROAS. Combined spend of £100–180/week yielding strong returns. This is the performance that justified continued investment.
Conversion audit confirms these were real purchases. The only conversion action firing was “Transactions (The Hairpin Leg Co.)” — a PURCHASE category action using data-driven attribution. No page views, no add-to-carts, no begin-checkouts in the mix.
Phase 7: The Collapse (Late Nov 2022 – Apr 2023)
The collapse was sudden and affected both campaigns simultaneously:
| Week Starting | C47 Clicks | C47 ROAS | C49 Clicks | C49 ROAS | Combined ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 21 | 51 | 5.60x | 152 | 1.49x | 2.44x |
| Nov 28 | 60 | 0.24x | 171 | 0.48x | 0.43x |
| Dec 5 | 49 | 1.33x | 168 | 3.33x | 2.95x |
| Dec 12 | 44 | 0.62x | 117 | 9.42x | 7.32x |
| Dec 19 | 30 | 0.16x | 97 | 2.75x | 2.42x |
| Dec 26 | 28 | 0.00x | 57 | 1.98x | 1.58x |
| Jan 2 | 27 | 12.88x | 70 | 8.41x | 9.39x |
| Jan 9 | 34 | 5.42x | 133 | 1.50x | 2.04x |
The week of November 28 was the inflection point: ROAS crashed to 0.43x across both campaigns. From here, performance became volatile and never sustainably recovered.
What happened to campaign 47 (NEW ID’S):
- Google progressively reduced its impressions from December onwards
- By January 2023, it was getting 18–34 clicks/week (down from 50–80)
- The algorithm effectively killed it — new products with no history building
- Last data: February 23, 2023
What happened to campaign 49 (All Knobs):
- Continued running but volatile. Some recovery weeks (Jan 2, Jan 16) mixed with poor ones
- February 20–March 27: The agency scaled budget dramatically, pushing from ~100 clicks/week to 350–537 clicks/week
- This was catastrophic: ROAS dropped to 0.03x–1.54x while burning £300–350/week
- The forced scaling sent Google to increasingly poor-quality traffic
- April 2023: Pulled back to ~100 clicks/week, still 0–1x ROAS
- May 2023: Effectively turned off (£7 spend)
Phase 8: Attribution Ghosts (Jun – Aug 2023)
Campaign 49 shows implausible numbers from June 2023:
| Week Starting | Clicks | Spend | Conversions | ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 19 | 87 | £87 | 92 | 14.32x |
| Jun 26 | 155 | £67 | 176 | 111.90x |
| Jul 3 | 191 | £75 | 215 | 53.84x |
| Jul 10 | 179 | £65 | 249 | 157.31x |
| Jul 17 | 184 | £69 | 239 | 87.28x |
These are garbage numbers. The conversion action breakdown reveals why:
| Month | Conversion Action | Category | Include in Conv? | Count |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 2023 | Analyzify - Page View | PAGE_VIEW | No | 222 |
| Jun 2023 | Analyzify - Purchase | PURCHASE | Yes | 1 |
| Jul 2023 | Analyzify - Page View | PAGE_VIEW | No | 787 |
| Jul 2023 | Analyzify - Purchase | PURCHASE | Yes | 11 |
| Jul 2023 | Analyzify - Begin Checkout | BEGIN_CHECKOUT | Yes | 7 |
| Jul 2023 | Analyzify - Add To Cart | ADD_TO_CART | Yes | 4 |
The massive conversion counts are Page View conversions from Analyzify’s pixel, not purchases. The “conversions” column in google_ads_raw_daily appears to aggregate all conversion actions (including non-purchase ones). Only ~12 actual purchases across the two months.
August 2023: All AP-era campaigns were paused. The SC (self-managed) era began.
Phase 9: SC Era — General Campaigns (2024 – Sep 2025)
Knob products served passively through general Shopping campaigns (Brand Shopping, Shopping Catch All). No dedicated knob campaigns.
Product-level data from google_ads_product_raw_daily shows knob products getting steady but low-volume Shopping traffic:
| Quarter | Products Served | Clicks | Spend | Conversions | Conv Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2024 | 22 | 25 | £12 | 0 | £0 |
| Q3 2024 | 22 | 8 | £5 | 0 | £0 |
| Q1 2025 | 29 | 228 | £216 | 22 | £1,019 |
| Q2 2025 | 29 | 400 | £322 | 30 | £2,861 |
| Q3 2025 | 29 | 364 | £360 | 27 | £1,549 |
(Q4 2024 excluded — Brand Shopping campaign restructuring period with minimal knob traffic.)
In 2025, the general Shopping campaigns actually delivered reasonable knob/handle performance. Q2 2025 showed 30 conversions on £322 spend = 8.88x ROAS through Shopping Catch All and Brand Shopping combined. The products found their natural level of Shopping demand without forced budget.
Phase 10: Revival Attempt (Oct – Dec 2025)
Campaign 74: Knobs Only Shopping (SC) — Killed after 3 weeks.
- 85 clicks, £104 spend, 2 conversions, £61 revenue = 0.58x ROAS
Campaign 75: PMax: Knobs Only Shopping (SC) — Ran Oct–Dec 2025.
| Month | Clicks | Spend | Purchase Conv | Purchase Value | Page Views (all_conv) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 2025 | — | — | 2 | £163 | 63 |
| Nov 2025 | — | — | 68 | £6,552 | 2,300 |
| Dec 2025 | — | — | 10 | £345 | 4,233 |
| Total | 9,703 | £2,461 | 80 | £7,060 | 6,596 |
The 80 “Analyzify - Purchase” conversions (which ARE include_in_conversions = true) at £7,060 give a 2.87x ROAS on paper. But November’s 68 purchases on a campaign with 912K impressions and 2.1M PMax reach raises the same attribution concerns as 2023. PMax claims conversions across all channels — any customer who saw a Display ad and later purchased organically gets attributed to PMax.
The conversion action breakdown also shows that “Analyzify - Add To Cart” (include_in_conversions = true) was racking up 182 conversions in November alone, suggesting the bidding algorithm was partially optimising toward add-to-carts rather than purchases.
Critical Finding: The Conversion Tracking Configuration
This is the most important finding in the audit.
The Problem
“Transactions (The Hairpin Leg Co.)” — the conversion action that tracked real purchases during the 2021–2023 era — was configured with:
| Setting | Value | Impact |
|---|---|---|
include_in_conversions | FALSE | Smart Bidding ignores this action |
attribution_model | Data-Driven | Good model, but irrelevant if excluded |
category | PURCHASE | Correctly categorised |
status | REMOVED | No longer active |
With include_in_conversions = false, Google’s Smart Bidding algorithms (tROAS, Maximise Conversions, etc.) did not optimise toward this conversion action. The campaigns were tracking purchases for reporting, but the bidding algorithm was not learning from them.
What Was the Algorithm Targeting?
During the 2021–2023 period, the purchase-category conversion actions with include_in_conversions = true were:
| ID | Name | Type | Include? | Attribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transactions (The Hairpin Leg Co.) | UA Transaction | No | Data-Driven |
| 2 | The Hairpin leg co - hairpin leg conversion tracking from adwords | Webpage pixel | Yes | Last Click |
| 8 | Hairpin Leg Company | Webpage pixel | No | Last Click |
Only conversion action 2 (“The Hairpin leg co - hairpin leg conversion tracking from adwords”) was included. This is an older Adwords-era pixel with Last Click attribution. It’s unclear whether this pixel was even firing correctly during 2022 — if it was a legacy tag on the old site, the algorithm may have been optimising toward nothing meaningful.
Why This Matters
If Smart Bidding had no reliable purchase signal to optimise toward during the 2022–2023 campaigns, then:
- The “good” Aug–Nov 2022 period may have been coincidental — the algorithm stumbling into good traffic despite not knowing what a conversion looked like
- The Nov 2022 collapse may be the algorithm drifting — without conversion signals, PMax gradually shifts to engagement/traffic metrics, serving to users who click but don’t buy
- The agency’s budget scaling in Mar 2023 was doomed from the start — you can’t push an algorithm to find more purchases if it doesn’t know what a purchase is
- The entire “knobs don’t work in Google Ads” narrative may be based on a broken setup
Current State (2025–2026)
The Analyzify conversion tracking (installed later) has Analyzify - Purchase with include_in_conversions = true. The 2025 knob campaigns (Oct–Dec) had purchase-only bidding — ATC and Begin Checkout were secondary (observation only) during that period, appearing only in the all_conversions column.
Analyzify - Add To Cart and Analyzify - Begin Checkout were switched to primary (included in bidding) around February 2026. Before that:
| Month | ATC in Bidding | ATC Observed | BC in Bidding | Purchase in Bidding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug–Nov 2025 | 0 | 940–1,245 | 0 | 312–473 |
| Dec 2025 | 1 | 983 | 1 | 645 |
| Jan 2026 | 1 | 1,059 | 0 | 745 |
| Feb 2026 | 14 | 308 | 5 | 184 |
This means the 2025 knob PMax campaign’s 2.87x ROAS was achieved with purchase-only bidding and correct conversion tracking — a materially fairer test than any of the 2021–2023 campaigns. The result (80 attributed purchases on £2,461 spend) still carries PMax attribution concerns, but the bidding setup was sound.
Micro-Conversion Strategy (Feb 12, 2026 Change)
Change date: February 12, 2026 at 14:06. Daniel at Snowball Creations switched “Analyzify - Begin Checkout” to primary (confirmed in Google Ads change history). “Analyzify - Add To Cart” was switched in the same session (not separately logged).
The ATC/BC switch to primary was applied account-wide, not limited to knob campaigns. In February 2026, ATC bidding conversions appeared across all major Shopping campaigns:
| Campaign | ATC (bidding) | ATC (observed) |
|---|---|---|
| Shopping Top Performers | 6.0 | 60 |
| Shopping Catch All <£20 | 4.0 | 95 |
| Shopping Catch All >£20 | 2.8 | 85 |
| Brand Shopping | 1.0 | 11 |
| Brand Search | 0.0 | 44 |
| PMax: Table Tops | 0.0 | 10 |
Why Account-Wide Might Be Justified
The per-SKU conversion data challenges the assumption that only low-volume categories need micro-conversions. In the last 3 months (Nov 2025 – Jan 2026):
| Per-SKU Conversions | SKU Count | % of Total |
|---|---|---|
| 0 conversions | 541 | 72% |
| Fractional (0–1) | 43 | 6% |
| 1–2 | 104 | 14% |
| 3–9 | 41 | 5% |
| 10–29 | 19 | 2.5% |
| 30+ (Smart Bidding threshold) | 5 | 0.7% |
Only 5 out of 753 SKUs clear the 30 conversions/quarter threshold. Those 5 are consolidated hairpin leg product groups (mkr-30-wa-01, etc.). Every other product category — including core ones — has the same per-SKU volume problem:
| Category | SKUs | Total Conv | SKUs with 10+ Conv | Avg Conv (converting SKUs) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hairpin Legs (mkr) | 5 | 216 | 3 | 43.2 |
| Box/Frame Legs | 67 | 138 | 3 | 4.0 |
| J-Hooks | 18 | 121 | 5 | 10.1 |
| Wall Shelves | 10 | 53 | 1 | 6.6 |
| Brackets/Shelf | 49 | 50 | 1 | 2.8 |
| Desk Legs | 39 | 48 | 1 | 4.4 |
| Wall Hooks | 5 | 42 | 2 | 10.6 |
| Knobs | 12 | 8 | 0 | 2.0 |
| Pull Handles | 10 | 0 | 0 | — |
This is a long-tail problem: 753 SKUs generating 1,073 conversions = 1.4 conversions per SKU per quarter. At campaign level, Shopping Top Performers generates enough purchase volume for Smart Bidding. But 72% of the individual products the algorithm must bid on have zero conversion history to learn from.
The argument for ATC as primary: an add-to-cart gives the algorithm per-product intent signals it can’t get from purchase data alone. If 50 people add a specific desk leg variant to cart in a month (even if only 15 buy), that’s 50 data points the algorithm can use for bid optimisation on that SKU, vs 15 without ATC.
The Trade-Off
The algorithm optimises toward whatever it counts as conversions. With ATC included, tROAS bidding targets a blend of purchase ROAS and add-to-cart “ROAS”. Since ~70% of add-to-carts don’t convert to purchase, the algorithm may learn to find efficient add-to-cart traffic that doesn’t actually buy.
The risk is higher for PMax than Standard Shopping. In Standard Shopping, the algorithm can only serve Shopping ads to people with purchase intent (they searched for a product). In PMax, adding ATC to bidding gives the algorithm permission to count Display/YouTube “add-to-cart” events as success — potentially accelerating the exact Display expansion problem that killed the knob campaigns in 2022.
A value hierarchy would help mitigate this: assign Purchase = full transaction value, Begin Checkout = 50%, ATC = 25%. This tells the algorithm which signal matters more, rather than treating all three equally. Whether Snowball have set differentiated values should be verified.
ROAS Inflation: The Reporting Problem
The ATC/BC change has a serious side-effect: every ROAS figure in Google Ads is now significantly inflated.
ATC conversion events record the full cart value at the time of add-to-cart. If a customer adds £100 of products to cart and then purchases, that generates £100 of ATC conversion value AND £100 of Purchase conversion value — £200 of reported “conversion value” on £100 of actual revenue.
Feb 1–12, 2026 comparison (reported vs purchase-only):
| Campaign | Spend | Reported Conv | Reported Value | Reported ROAS | Purchase Conv | Purchase Value | Real ROAS | Inflation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brand Search | £4,137 | 54.1 | £9,123 | 2.21x | 35.1 | £6,424 | 1.55x | 30% |
| Catch All >£20 | £3,349 | 106.9 | £12,104 | 3.61x | 62.0 | £6,859 | 2.05x | 43% |
| Top Performers | £2,384 | 72.1 | £8,868 | 3.72x | 37.0 | £4,120 | 1.73x | 54% |
| Catch All <£20 | £668 | 52.0 | £1,952 | 2.92x | 27.0 | £1,147 | 1.72x | 41% |
| Brand Shopping | £276 | 21.4 | £1,267 | 4.59x | 12.6 | £774 | 2.80x | 39% |
Three consequences:
-
All ROAS reporting is inflated 30–54%. Shopping Top Performers shows 3.72x when purchase ROAS is 1.73x. That’s the difference between “profitable campaign” and “barely breaking even after COGS.”
-
Historical data is retroactively inflated. Google applies
include_in_conversionssettings to all historical data. Reports for January, December 2025, etc. now show ATC in the Conversions column too, even though ATC was secondary during those periods. Before/after comparisons against pre-Feb 12 data are meaningless in the Google Ads UI. -
Smart Bidding targets a blended number. When tROAS is set to 3.5x, the algorithm targets 3.5x on purchases + add-to-carts combined. A campaign could deliver 2x purchase ROAS while the algorithm believes it’s hitting 3.5x and doesn’t adjust. The bidding is effectively set ~40% looser than intended.
This is an account-wide issue, not knob-specific. Every campaign with ATC activity is affected. The inflation is highest on Shopping campaigns (40–54%) because Shopping drives the most add-to-cart events.
Recommendation: If the micro-conversion strategy is retained for its per-SKU signal benefits, the tROAS targets need to be recalibrated upward to account for the inflated denominator. A 3.5x tROAS with ATC included is roughly equivalent to a 2.0x purchase-only tROAS. Alternatively, assign ATC a nominal value (e.g. £1 or 25% of cart value) rather than the full transaction value, which preserves the signal volume benefit without destroying ROAS reporting accuracy.
The Item ID Change Investigation
What Happened
In July 2022, the agency created campaign 47 using the exact same Shopify product/variant IDs with (new) appended:
Original: shopify_gb_5150347165830_34746935017606
New: shopify_gb_5150347165830_34746935017606(new)
This was done for all ~28 knob variants across the 7 original knob products. The rationale was presumably to “reset” the products’ quality scores in Google’s system.
Did It Work?
No. Campaign 47 (new IDs) and Campaign 49 (original IDs + handles) were running simultaneously from July 2022 onwards. Comparing their performance:
| Period | C47 (New IDs) ROAS | C49 (Original IDs) ROAS | Winner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 2022 | 8.53x | 7.51x | New IDs (marginally) |
| Sep 2022 | 11.57x | 5.93x | New IDs |
| Oct 2022 | 4.17x | 4.38x | Tie |
| Nov 2022 | 5.43x | 3.78x | New IDs |
| Dec 2022 | 0.66x | 4.68x | Original IDs |
| Jan 2023 | 4.07x | 3.26x | New IDs |
| Feb 2023 | 4.46x | 1.65x | New IDs |
Campaign 47 (new IDs) had slightly better ROAS in most months, but both campaigns collapsed at the same time (late November 2022). If the ID change were the differentiating factor, one campaign should have performed differently from the other. Instead, they rose and fell together, suggesting the performance driver was external (seasonality, competition, algorithm behaviour) not product-ID-specific.
Google also progressively reduced impressions for campaign 47 from December onwards, despite its (marginally) better ROAS. By January 2023, it was getting 18–34 clicks/week while campaign 49 got 70–150. The algorithm preferred the campaign with more products and more history, regardless of the “new” IDs.
Conclusion: The item ID change was irrelevant. The (new) suffix didn’t meaningfully change performance, and Google treated the products similarly regardless.
The Handle Products Tell a Different Story
Campaign 49 contained new product types — Knurl Pull Handles, Spiral Pull Handles, and (from Feb 2023) Bar Trim Pull Handles. These weren’t just knobs with new IDs; they were genuinely different products:
| Product | Lifetime Clicks | Lifetime Spend | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Knurl Pull Handle (6540915441798) | 9,965 | £14,176 | Pull Handle |
| Bar Trim Pull Handle (6540915507334) | 3,812 | £4,093 | Pull Handle |
| Spiral Pull Handle (6540915474566) | 3,157 | £3,238 | Pull Handle |
The Knurl Pull Handle alone accumulated more spend than all dedicated knob campaigns combined. These are higher-priced products (£10–20 per unit) that appear to have stronger Shopping demand. The “All Knobs and Handles” campaign’s lifetime ROAS was heavily carried by the handle products, not the original knob designs.
What Caused the Late November 2022 Collapse?
The data rules out several potential causes and points to a specific mechanism.
What It Was NOT
Not an account-wide problem. The rest of the account performed well through the exact same period:
| Week | Knob ROAS | Rest of Account ROAS |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 7 | 8.84x | 8.49x |
| Nov 14 | 5.57x | 6.81x |
| Nov 21 | 2.44x | 8.85x |
| Nov 28 | 0.43x | 6.55x |
| Dec 5 | 2.95x | 8.40x |
| Dec 12 | 7.32x | 6.09x |
The rest of the account maintained 6–8.5x ROAS throughout Black Friday and into December. Whatever killed knobs didn’t affect anything else.
Not a CPC spike (competition). CPCs on both knob campaigns actually decreased through the collapse — campaign 47 went from £0.74 (Nov 21) to £0.56 (Nov 28) to £0.33 by late December. Campaign 49 stayed in the £0.50–0.87 range. Competitors didn’t outbid Hairpin.
Not a conversion tracking change. The only conversion action firing throughout was “Transactions (The Hairpin Leg Co.)” — same before, during, and after the collapse. No new actions appeared, no existing ones stopped.
What Actually Happened: PMax Display/YouTube Expansion
The impression and CTR data tells a clear story:
| Week | Impressions | CTR | Clicks | Conversions | Clicks per Conv |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 22 (peak) | 8,572 | 1.80% | 154 | 9.1 | 17 |
| Sep 12 | 8,777 | 1.74% | 153 | 9.9 | 15 |
| Oct 24 | 14,218 | 1.31% | 186 | 14.3 | 13 |
| Oct 31 | 21,035 | 0.95% | 199 | 5.5 | 36 |
| Nov 7 | 25,292 | 0.97% | 246 | 9.2 | 27 |
| Nov 14 | 23,102 | 1.06% | 246 | 10.0 | 25 |
| Nov 21 | 18,350 | 1.11% | 203 | 4.1 | 50 |
| Nov 28 | 25,532 | 0.90% | 231 | 3.0 | 76 |
| Dec 5 | 24,482 | 0.89% | 217 | 4.9 | 44 |
The progression:
- Aug–Sep: 8–10K impressions/week, 1.7–1.8% CTR, 15–17 clicks per conversion. Tight, Search-heavy traffic that converts.
- Late Oct: Impressions jumped to 21K. CTR dropped below 1%. PMax started expanding into Display/YouTube to spend the daily budget.
- Nov: Impressions hit 25K. The extra 15K impressions came with 0.3–0.5% CTR (Display/YouTube typical). The algorithm was now generating 2–3x more impressions but the same number of clicks, and fewer conversions.
- Nov 28: The ratio hit 76 clicks per conversion (vs 13–17 during the good period). For every converting click, the algorithm was burning 75 non-converting ones.
PMax reports all network types as “MIXED”, so we can’t see the exact Search/Display/YouTube split. But the pattern is unmistakable: impressions doubled while CTR halved and conversion rate collapsed. That only happens when the algorithm shifts budget from Search (high CTR, high intent) to Display/YouTube (low CTR, low intent).
Why PMax Expanded
PMax automatically expands to non-Search channels when it can’t fully spend the budget on Search alone. For niche products like knobs, there’s limited Search inventory — only so many people search for “kitchen knobs” each week. When the daily budget exceeds what Search can absorb, PMax fills the gap with Display and YouTube placements.
The expansion likely started around late October (first week above 20K impressions). ROAS was still acceptable because existing Search conversions masked the Display waste. But as PMax allocated more budget to non-Search channels, the conversion signal weakened:
- Fewer Search conversions (budget diverted to Display)
- PMax interprets Display impressions as “this audience works” (because there’s no conversion signal saying otherwise — remember,
include_in_conversions = falseon the purchase action) - Algorithm doubles down on Display/YouTube (it thinks the expanded audience is working)
- Search allocation shrinks further (self-reinforcing decline)
The Conversion Tracking Made This Worse
With “Transactions” set to include_in_conversions = false, Smart Bidding had no reliable purchase signal to self-correct. In a properly configured account, the algorithm would see Display clicks producing zero purchases and shift back to Search. Without that signal, the feedback loop had no brake.
Product-Level Impact
Before the collapse (Oct 10–Nov 14), 12 different product variants were converting, including 5 knob variants. After (Nov 21–Dec 26), only the Knurl Pull Handle variants continued converting with any consistency. The original knob products (515034xxx series) almost entirely stopped converting — they were the first casualties of the traffic quality decline.
15 products also dropped from the feed around December 5 (product count fell from 58 to 43), which further reduced the campaign’s ability to match relevant searches.
The Agency’s Response Made It Worse
Add People responded to the decline by dramatically scaling campaign 49’s budget in late February – March 2023:
| Week | Clicks | Spend | ROAS | Agency Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 13 | 107 | £48 | 7.62x | Stable (small) |
| Feb 20 | 362 | £220 | 0.23x | Scaled 4x |
| Feb 27 | 506 | £325 | 1.52x | Still scaled |
| Mar 6 | 537 | £356 | 1.54x | Still scaled |
| Mar 13 | 477 | £342 | 0.29x | Still scaled |
| Mar 20 | 448 | £329 | 0.03x | Still scaled |
| Mar 27 | 460 | £347 | 0.39x | Still scaled |
Four weeks at £300–350/week with sub-1x ROAS = £1,374 burned. The forced scaling sent Google to lower-quality traffic that couldn’t convert. The correct response would have been to reduce spend and investigate the conversion tracking setup.
Product-Level Insights
Order Economics: Both Categories Are Multi-Unit
The unit price difference between knobs (£7–9) and handles (£10–20) is misleading. Both categories are multi-unit purchases:
| Metric | Knobs | Pull Handles |
|---|---|---|
| Orders containing product | 1,482 | 1,281 |
| Total line items | 1,634 | 1,779 |
| Average quantity per line | 5.5 | 5.2 |
| Average line value | £46 | £76 |
| Total category revenue | £74,412 | £135,910 |
Quantity distribution (line items):
| Qty Bucket | Knobs | Avg Knob Value | Handles | Avg Handle Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 338 (21%) | £8 | 493 (28%) | £15 |
| 2 | 354 (22%) | £16 | 338 (19%) | £29 |
| 3–4 | 341 (21%) | £30 | 343 (19%) | £54 |
| 5–6 | 213 (13%) | £47 | 197 (11%) | £86 |
| 7–10 | 187 (11%) | £69 | 178 (10%) | £120 |
| 11–20 | 146 (9%) | £120 | 156 (9%) | £209 |
| 21+ | 55 (3%) | £277 | 74 (4%) | £396 |
Both products show the same multi-unit buying pattern. The difference is price-per-unit (handles are ~1.7x more expensive), not buying behaviour. A customer buying 6 handles generates ~£86 vs ~£47 for 6 knobs — handles are higher-value but not a fundamentally different purchase pattern.
Handle-only orders: Average order total of £118, with £106 of that being handle products and an average of 7.2 handles per order.
Cross-buy: 219 orders (8% of either category) contain both knobs and handles. The categories are largely separate customer pools — people buying knobs are rarely buying handles in the same order, and vice versa.
Knobs vs Handles in Google Ads (2025)
The 2025 SC-era data, where both categories served passively through general Shopping campaigns, reveals something counterintuitive:
| Quarter | Knob Clicks | Knob Spend | Knob ROAS | Handle Clicks | Handle Spend | Handle ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 2025 | 152 | £127 | 3.67x | 776 | £1,228 | 1.81x |
| Q2 2025 | 239 | £208 | 8.43x* | 708 | £874 | 3.30x |
| Q3 2025 | 228 | £205 | 4.26x | 595 | £1,002 | 2.96x |
| Q4 2025 | 2,523 | £421 | 1.48x | 518 | £970 | 1.98x |
* Q2 2025 knob ROAS is skewed by three bulk orders (£453, £358, £184) that account for 75% of the quarter’s revenue. Excluding those weeks, the baseline is closer to 2.5–3x ROAS. Low-volume categories are inherently volatile — a single 50-knob order can swing a quarter’s numbers.
Handles absorbed 4–6x more budget than knobs. This isn’t because handles are “better” at converting — it’s because Google’s algorithm learned handle conversion patterns during the 2022–2024 PMax/Shopping campaigns and continues to serve them aggressively. Knobs were left passive and their ROAS looks healthy at natural demand levels, though it’s volatile week-to-week.
Realistic baseline: Knobs at passive Shopping volumes deliver ~2.5–4x ROAS, comparable to handles at similar spend levels. The headline quarterly numbers bounce around because any single bulk order (20+ units at £7–9 each = £140–180) can double a week’s revenue on £10–20 of spend.
The Knurl Pull Handle (product ID 6540915441798) alone accounts for £14,176 in lifetime Shopping spend — more than all dedicated knob campaigns combined. Its 2025 ROAS was 1.69–2.67x, which is in the same realistic range as knobs once you account for volume volatility. The handles just get more budget thrown at them.
Best-Performing Knob Products (2025, All Finishes)
| Product | Clicks | Spend | Conv | Conv Value | ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Knurl 40mm (kndisk2) | 345 | £275 | 25 | £1,258 | 4.57x |
| Disk 30mm | 197 | £142 | 15 | £1,003 | 7.05x |
| Knurl 18mm (knpip) | 80 | £85 | 11 | £600 | 7.04x |
| Conical 18mm | 73 | £55 | 4 | £145 | 2.62x |
| Hex 30mm | 58 | £34 | 5 | £239 | 6.97x |
| Square 30mm | 27 | £23 | 0 | £0 | 0.00x |
| Bowl 40mm | 28 | £30 | 4 | £265 | 8.95x |
The Knurl 40mm, Disk 30mm, and Knurl 18mm are reliable performers. Bowl 40mm shows strong ROAS but on very few clicks.
Best-Performing Handle Products (2025)
| Product | Clicks | Spend | Conv | Conv Value | ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Knurl Pull Handle | 2,013 | £3,659 | 94 | £7,665 | 2.09x |
| Bar Trim Pull Handle | 435 | £286 | 15 | £1,773 | 6.20x |
| Spiral Pull Handle | 142 | £123 | 6 | £563 | 4.59x |
| Knurl 15mm Pull Handle | 7 | £6 | 0 | £0 | — |
The Knurl Pull Handle consumes most of the handle budget but at only 2.09x ROAS. Bar Trim and Spiral handles perform better at lower volumes. The same pattern as knobs: the products that get less forced budget have better ROAS.
Low-Volume Variance: The Industrial Nickel Example (wh-kndisk2-40-sl)
The Knurl 40mm Knob in Industrial Nickel was the best-performing knob variant in 2025:
- Q2 2025: 45 clicks, £34 spend, 8 conversions, £644 value = 18.79x ROAS
- Q3 2025: 33 clicks, £34 spend, 2 conversions, £148 value = 4.34x ROAS
This isn’t an unexplained anomaly — it’s a direct consequence of low volume. At 30–45 clicks per quarter, a single multi-unit order (e.g. 10 knobs at £8.95 = £90) can double the quarter’s ROAS. The same applies in reverse: a quarter with zero large orders looks terrible. This variance is inherent to any product with under ~100 clicks/month and is exactly why quarterly ROAS figures for individual knob variants should be treated as noise rather than signal.
Handle Historical Performance by Quarter
The Knurl Pull Handle was by far the most-served handle product. Its trajectory shows the diminishing returns of scale:
| Period | Knurl PH Clicks | Knurl PH Spend | Knurl PH ROAS | Campaign Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q3 2022 | 446 | £378 | 3.92x | PMax “All Knobs and Handles” |
| Q4 2022 | 1,080 | £1,027 | 5.00x | Peak period |
| Q1 2023 | 739 | £459 | 1.60x | Post-collapse |
| Q2 2023 | 252 | £126 | 32.80x* | Attribution artefact |
| Q3 2023 | 208 | £78 | 68.44x* | Attribution artefact |
| Q4 2023 | 557 | £1,011 | 3.61x | SC general campaigns |
| Q1 2024 | 1,800 | £1,935 | 1.53x | Heavy spend era |
| Q2 2024 | 1,985 | £3,282 | 1.45x | Peak spend, poor ROAS |
| Q3 2024 | 365 | £898 | 1.14x | Budget cut |
| Q1 2025 | 706 | £1,190 | 1.69x | Stabilised |
| Q2 2025 | 502 | £720 | 2.67x | Reduced spend, better ROAS |
* Q2-Q3 2023 are PMax attribution artefacts (page view conversions).
The pattern is clear: the Knurl Pull Handle performs best at moderate spend levels. When pushed to £1,000+/quarter, ROAS drops below 2x. At £700–900/quarter, it settles around 2–2.5x. This is the same over-scaling problem that killed the dedicated knob campaigns.
Should Knobs & Handles Be Retried?
Arguments For
-
The conversion tracking was broken. Every dedicated knob campaign (2021–2023) ran with
include_in_conversions = falseon the purchase action. Smart Bidding was flying blind. A retry with correctly configured conversion tracking could perform materially better. -
Passive Shopping already works for both categories. In 2025, knobs generated 15–25 conversions per quarter at ~2.5–4x ROAS through general campaigns (volatile due to low volume, individual bulk orders swing quarterly numbers). Handles generated 20–38 conversions at 2–3x ROAS. The product-market fit exists for both at modest spend levels.
-
The AOV supports paid search for both. Knobs: avg line value £46, avg order total £86. Handles: avg line value £76, avg order total £118. Neither is the £7 single-unit sale that the unit price suggests. Both are viable at CPCs under £1.
-
Handles have never been tested with correct conversion tracking either. The Knurl Pull Handle’s £14K lifetime spend was almost entirely through PMax campaigns with broken or diluted conversion goals. Standard Shopping with purchase-only bidding has never been tried at scale.
Arguments Against
-
Four separate dedicated knob attempts all failed. Different structures, different times, same result. Though the broken conversion tracking casts doubt on all of them.
-
Handles already hit diminishing returns at current spend. The Knurl Pull Handle drops below 2x ROAS above ~£250/quarter spend. There may not be enough converting search demand to justify a dedicated campaign.
-
Generic search terms, low brand intent. People search for “copper kitchen handles” and “cabinet knobs” — generic terms where Hairpin competes on price against B&Q, Screwfix, and Dunelm.
-
PMax is the wrong format. Every PMax attempt dumped 25–30% of budget into Display/YouTube with zero conversions. Any retry must be Standard Shopping only.
-
Opportunity cost. £10,650 on knobs could have gone to table legs or shelving. But the same argument applies in reverse: the £14K spent on the Knurl Pull Handle at 1.5x ROAS was also poorly allocated.
Recommendation
Do not create a new dedicated campaign yet. Instead:
-
Evaluate the conversion tracking change. ATC and Begin Checkout were switched to primary (bidding) in Feb 2026. At the account level (300–745 purchases/month), this dilutes the bidding signal unnecessarily. Consider reverting them to secondary for general campaigns, and only using them as primary if a dedicated low-volume campaign needs the signal volume.
-
Monitor passive Shopping performance for both categories. The general Shopping campaigns are already generating reasonable volumes. Knobs: 15–25 conv/quarter at ~2.5–4x baseline ROAS (volatile due to low volume). Handles: 20–38 conv/quarter at 2–3x ROAS.
-
Investigate the Knurl Pull Handle over-spend. This single product absorbs £700–1,200/quarter in general Shopping campaigns at 1.7–2.7x ROAS. It may be worth capping its spend or ensuring it doesn’t crowd out better-performing products (Bar Trim at 6.2x, individual knobs at 4–9x).
-
If a dedicated campaign is warranted, use Standard Shopping only (no PMax), combining both knobs and handles:
- £10–15/day maximum budget
- TARGET_ROAS bidding at 3x minimum
- Purchase-only conversion goal (correctly configured)
- Run for 3 months minimum before evaluating
-
Track category-level, not unit-level, metrics. The right comparison isn’t “£7 knob vs £15 handle” — it’s “£46 avg knob line vs £76 avg handle line.” Both categories have viable economics; the question is whether dedicated budget can scale them without destroying ROAS. Historical evidence says the ceiling is modest for both.
Unanswered Questions
-
What was Aug–Dec 2020 performance? No product-level data. Would need agency reports or Google Ads UI export history from Add People.
-
Was the gap really 16 months? Were knobs in a campaign we can’t see, or genuinely absent from the feed?
-
Competitor landscape change? No competitive data from 2020–2022 to compare against.
-
Was conversion action 2 (“The Hairpin leg co”) actually firing during 2022? If this legacy Adwords pixel was broken, Smart Bidding had literally zero conversion signal.
-
Can correct conversion tracking change the outcome? This is the key open question. Every prior attempt had a broken setup. A clean retry with proper tracking would definitively answer whether the product works in paid search or not.
Data Sources
google_ads_raw_daily— campaign-level daily data (complete from Jan 2020)google_ads_product_raw_daily— product-level Shopping data (sparse 2020, good from Sep 2021)google_ads_conversion_action_daily— conversion breakdown by action per campaign per daygoogle_ads_conversion_actions— conversion action configuration (attribution model, include_in_conversions, lookback windows)google_ads_search_term_daily— search term dataad_campaigns— campaign metadata